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2. Canada is a vital U.S. 
export market 
3. Macro-economic      
factors heavily         
influence trade 
4. Trade flows are       
regionally variable 
5. Security regimes also 
influence trade 
6. FAST is useful        
primarily in Detroit 
7. NAFTA tariffs can     
create useless cost 
burdens 
TRAVEL: 
8. Large ports-of-entry 
handle most travelers 
9. At large ports, travel  
is discretionary and 
very local 
10. Border processes 
have disrupted       
borderlands 
11. Social and economic 
impacts are worse 
near large ports 
SUMMARY: 
12. Policy summary and 
source citations 
 
  Volume 4, No. 1  Winter 2009      Web Address:  www.wwu.edu/bpri 
The Border Policy Research Institute (BPRI) was established in 
2005 in order to examine processes and policies related to the 
Canada – U.S. border.  The motivating factor was widespread 
awareness that the border was impacting commerce and soci-
ety to an increased extent in the post-9/11 era.  The BPRI has 
sought to understand and analyze border-related processes,   
to explain policy implications, and to assist in the development 
of new policy.  The body of research we have undertaken since 
2005 has pointed to significant problems in the efficient and  
secure management of cross-border flows of trade and travel.   
 
Although border management processes relate to a range of 
policy areas, those related to cross-border trade and travel 
flows are particularly significant in the context of the recent  
economic crisis and the new post-election momentum to rethink 
Canada – U.S. policy options.  Our nations must aim to ensure 
adequate security while not compromising our shared economic 
future nor accepting cultural degradation in our borderlands. 
 
This evidence-based report focuses on trade and travel        
patterns  at the border, how such activity has been affected    
by security policy changes, and policy implications that could     
inform business, governments, and other stakeholders charged 
with developing the next generation of management of the  
Canada – U.S. border. 
 
Certain policy paradigms emerge when reviewing this report’s 
contents:  the efficacy of harmonized bilateral processes, as 
opposed to unilateral solutions; the inappropriateness of rigid 
“top down” policies in light of varied regional realities; the 
ephemeral goal of absolute control of the border, as contrasted 
with a risk-management approach. 
 
The research products summarized within this report are       
accessible via our website—see the URL in the masthead.   
The research itself would not have been possible without finan-
cial support from the Washington State Legislature, the U.S.       
Department of Transportation (Office of the Secretary, grant # 
DTOS59-05-G-00016), and the BorderNet Initiative of the     
Canadian government. 
 
Canada is the most important export market for 
the United States, and vice versa. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS: 
• The economies of Canada and the U.S. are highly integrated.  Any inefficiencies associated with cross-
border commerce hamper our integrated economy and reduce our global competitiveness. 
• A renewed effort to reduce border-related inefficiencies is important during the current economic crisis.  
• From a viewpoint of economic self-interest, the U.S. – Canadian relationship should be of paramount      
importance to both countries’ governments and citizenry. 
 
 
Canada is the primary foreign export market for 36 of the lower-48 states, and the second-ranked 
market for all the others except New Mexico and Louisiana.  For states in the northern Great 
Plains, over 50 percent of their exports are destined for Canada, and in general, from one-fifth to 
one-half of exports from the Midwest industrial states are Canada-bound.  Canada is the largest 


















































In the mid- to late-1990s, with NAFTA in effect and with a robust North American economy, two-
way trade grew steadily.  The progressive weakening of the Canadian dollar throughout that pe-
riod led to greater growth of U.S imports than of exports, as the relative cost of Canadian goods 
fell.  In the early 2000s, in the aftermath of 9/11 and the ruptured “dot-com bubble,” trade was 
stagnant for three years.  With a resurgent economy in the late 2000s, two-way trade again grew 
steadily.  In that period, though, a strengthening Canadian dollar resulted in a narrowing of trade 
imbalances, with U.S. exports almost equal to imports by 2007.  Trucks have always carried the 
vast majority of the trade. 
The volume of cross-border trade is dictated primarily 
by macro-economic factors and policies. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS: 
• Each nation must create policies that are facilitative both of imports and of exports.  The balance of trade 
will differ over time. 
• Policies aimed at overall North American economic growth are of the greatest importance (e.g., the NAFTA 
framework). 
• Other policies that influence the trading relationship, such as border-related processes, are also important.  









Value of  U.S. Exports to and Imports from Canada: 


































Cross-border trade varies regionally, and north-
bound flows can differ from south-bound.  Trade 






























































































































































































































































Value and Composition of  Trade 
at 5 Major Ports (October 2007) 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS: 
• The kinds of goods crossing the border are 
significantly different from port to port.  A 
security regime optimized for facilitation of 
one group of commodities (e.g., manufac-
tured goods) will thus be more effective at 
some ports than others. 
• Accomplishing secure bidirectional trade 
facilitation at a fairly small number of ports 
can lead to reduced cost-of-goods for a 
disproportionately large segment of the 
integrated Canada – U.S. economy. 
 
U.S. exports to Canada (carried by truck 
and train) amounted to $19,051 million of 
goods in October 2007.  68 percent of the 
goods passed through the five ports 
shown to the right, with Detroit single-
handedly responsible for 36 percent of the 
goods ($6,902 million).  In general, manu-
factured goods (commodity codes 82 
through 96) comprise the greatest fraction 
of U.S. exports to Canada.  At Detroit, 
such goods  account for over 70 percent 
of two-way trade, a much higher propor-
tion than exhibited at any other port.  In 
contrast, U.S. imports from Canada in-
clude relatively greater proportions of re-
source-based commodities (agricultural 
products, minerals/ores, refined metals, 
wood).  Manufactured goods are the 
dominant fraction of imports only in the 
Midwest industrial region.  The cross-
border economic integration in that region 
is evident, with the commodity profile of 
exports in that region (i.e., at Buffalo and 
Detroit) almost identical to the profile of 
imports.  At Eastern and Western ports, 
profiles of exports differ from those of   
imports, and the balance of trade is not  
as equal. 
Food, beverages, agricultural commodities 
Minerals, ores, chemicals, plastics, rubber, fossil fuels 
Wood, fabrics, clothing, paper products, books 
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Time Period Percentage 
Shortfall 
Dollar Amount Shortfall 
(billions of US $) 
2001 Q3 8.6% $5.2 Billion 
2001 Q4 21.4% $10.8 Billion 
2002 19.4% $10.3 Billion 
2003 25.8% $13.7 Billion 
2004 17.5% $10.4 Billion 
2005 Q1 & Q2 12.2% $11.4 Billion 
Time Period Percentage 
Shortfall 
Dollar Amount Shortfall 
(billions of US $) 
2001 Q3 18.0% $5.5 Billion 
2001 Q4 22.8% $8.2 Billion 
2002 19.8% $6.8 Billion 
2003 15.8% $7.3 Billion 
2004 3.9% $1.4 Billion 
2005 Q1 & Q2 (5.8% increase) ($2.5 Billion increase) 
Trade is affected by border-security regimes.  
Cross-border trade slowed after 9/11, with great-
est impact upon U.S. imports from Canada. 
Estimated Shortfall in U.S. Exports 
Estimated Shortfall in U.S. Imports 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS: 
• The ideal border inspection regime delivers heightened security, while imposing little or no added burden (in 
terms of delay or cost).  Post-9/11 security regimes are not yet close to the ideal, with negative economic im-
pacts persisting for the integrated Canada – U.S. economy. 
• Harmonized security regimes could help address the issue of larger impacts upon imports than upon exports. 
 
Econometric analysis of trade data has shown that significant trade shortfalls developed in the 
period immediately following 9/11—shortfalls that can’t be explained by typical factors such as 
the overall trend of the GDP, the exchange rate, etc.  While the shortfall in U.S. exports to     
Canada was largely resolved by 2005 (as seen in the lower table), the shortfall in U.S. imports 
persisted, with impacts more evident at certain ports.  The increased cost of cross-border trade, 




The FAST program is intended to minimize the 
impact of border-security processes upon truck-
borne trade.  In Detroit, 44 percent of shipments 
enter the U.S. via FAST lanes.  Outside of the  
Detroit region, FAST receives less use. 
Blaine, WA Buffalo, NY 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS: 
• A FAST port has valuable infrastructure (a road lane and inspection booth) dedicated to the program, so 
proof should exist that FAST enhances a port’s efficiency.  Alternative infrastructure use should be evalu-
ated in instances where efficiency gains are not evident. 
• Alternative program designs should be evaluated, aiming to lower the costs of entry. 
 
 
The relatively low FAST utili-
zation rate in areas other 
than Detroit is a subject of 
much research.  The design 
of the FAST program 
meshes with the nature of 
cross-border commerce in 
the auto-belt—i.e., shippers 
are sophisticated companies 
able to afford the cost of es-
tablishing eligibility; carriers 
are large firms carrying full 
truckloads of a given com-
modity over a short distance.  
At Blaine, in contrast, many 
carriers are “mom and pop” 
firms that can’t afford to es-
tablish eligibility.  Many loads 
consist of multiple consign-
ments, meaning that the 
truck can’t use FAST unless 
all the shippers associated 
with the load are enrolled in 
FAST.  And commodities that 
have a supply chain that is 
inherently difficult to secure 
(e.g., agriculture) are more 
prevalent. 
6 
NAFTA tariff rules are a source of border-related 
cost.  Most  tariff revenue derives from just a few 
of the 100 “chapter-level” tariff categories.  But 
companies must verify compliance with NAFTA 
rules-of-origin for all shipments, resulting in pri-
vate-sector costs that yield no real public benefit.   
The great majority of tariff revenue is generated within a small number of tariff categories (HTS  
chapters)—e.g., the 10 categories listed above account for 76 percent of the tariff revenue that is 
collected.  Many categories account for little or no revenue (i.e., there is no tariff imposed within 
the given category).  Yet the paperwork to verify compliance with NAFTA rules-of-origin for a 
zero-tariff shipment can cost as much as two percent of the value of the shipment.  One study 
examined exports from Washington State to Canada, estimating the compliance costs associ-
ated with tariff categories for which both Canada and the U.S. impose a zero tariff.  The study 
found that the costs amounted to as much as  $40.8 million per year.  Eliminating the need for 
shippers to demonstrate compliance with these “zero-zero” tariff categories would result in no  
reduction in tariff revenue for either nation, yet provide significant benefit to shippers. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS: 
• Significant net economic benefit can be realized by reworking NAFTA tariff rules.  
• For zero-tariff categories, waiving NAFTA rules-of-origin would have no effect on tariff revenue.  For 
many other categories, the tariff is so small that the revenue lost by eliminating tariffs and waiving rules-of-
origin would be far outweighed by the savings in private-sector compliance costs. 
Value of  Duties Collected, by Tariff  Category, upon Imports in 2006            
(Total for All 100 Categories Combined = $25,159,011,720) 
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62 - Apparel and clothing accessories (not knitted) $4,389,441,874 17.4% 17.4%
61 - Apparel and clothing accessories (knitted) $4,285,014,712 17.0% 34.5%
87 - Vehicles, parts, and accessories (other than rail) $2,883,414,732 11.5% 45.9%
64 - Footwear and related goods $1,873,663,256 7.4% 53.4%
85 - Electrical machinery, consumer electronics $1,681,935,892 6.7% 60.1%
84 - Machinery, mechanical appliances, boilers $1,161,471,270 4.6% 64.7%
42 - Leather goods, handbags, suitcases, saddlery $997,761,085 4.0% 68.7%
39 - Plastics and plastic articles $769,535,433 3.1% 71.7%
63 - Textile goods other than clothing and apparel $678,851,851 2.7% 74.4%
94 - Furniture, lamps, mattresses, cushions, etc. $407,576,790 1.6% 76.0%
30 ports handling 
< 100 per day Port Huron, MI—5,413 per day 
Buffalo, NY—16,509 per day 
Detroit, MI—15,436 per day 
Blaine, WA—7,115 per day 
13 ports handling > 1,000 per day 
30 ports handling 
100-1,000 per day 
Number of  Vehicles Entering the U.S. Daily via Various POEs, 2006 
(Average Daily Total of  62,092 Vehicles) 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS: 
• Deployment of a full suite of technology at all 121 road crossings requires a budget several times larger 
than past budgets.  Absent such an investment, certain technologies can be defeated simply by crossing at a 
smaller POE. 
• Confirmation should exist that the current pattern of technology deployment is optimal.  From a risk-
management perspective, would technology be better employed at the continental perimeter?  At random, 









Automobile traffic is heavily concentrated at a 
small number of the 77 ports-of-entry (POEs).  
Sophisticated security technology is likewise 
concentrated at the larger POEs. 
As shown above, 86 percent of the cross-border auto traffic is accommodated by the 17 largest 
POEs (those handling > 1,000 cars per day), with the remaining traffic dispersed among the 60 
smaller POEs.  The 77 POEs actually represent 121 separate roads, because a given POE might 
consist of several nearby roads (e.g., the Buffalo POE consists of four bridges).  Following the 
principles of risk management (and cost containment), security technology (such as Radiation 
Portal Monitors and License Plate Readers) has been deployed at the POEs that handle over 80 
percent of the traffic.  This means, though, that such technology is absent at a large majority of 
the actual road crossings. 
Canadian Residents — Trip 
origins north of the border, 
destinations south 
U.S. Residents — Trip 






• Significant reductions in border congestion can be achieved if more of the frequent border-crossers can be 
persuaded to enroll in NEXUS. 
• Marketing of NEXUS should be targeted at population centers close to the border and at  leisure travelers, 
rather than business travelers. 
In a 2007 study, 15,000 
people were interviewed 
to  fathom  travelers’      
behavior in the Cascade 
Gateway.  On average, 
91 percent of their travel 
(combined  weekend/
weekday) is discretionary.  
Shopping, vacations,  
recreation, and friend/
family visits are the  
dominant trip purposes.  
About two-thirds of the 
trips begin and end within 
30 miles of the border (as 
the crow flies).  Despite 
the fact that long border 
queues  are  common, 
many travelers who cross 
frequently (i.e., once per 
month) are not enrolled in 
NEXUS.  At the Cascade 
Gateway,  the majority of 
travelers are Canadians.  
A similar study in the  
Buffalo-Niagara region 
reveals the same basic 
pattern—a predominance 
of discretionary travel and 
near-border trips—
although Americans  
comprise the majority of 
travelers in that region. 
Origins and Destinations of  Cross-border Trips at 













At the busiest POEs, most travel is discretionary 
and most trips occur within a short distance of 
the border.  A borderland culture is evident. 
9 
Passenger travel across the border is affected 
both by security processes and by macro-
economics.  At the POEs serving the I-5 corridor 
(Blaine, Lynden, Sumas), the historic relation-
ship between the exchange rate and the volume 
of travel was disrupted in the aftermath of 9/11. 
For a 16-year period (1985 – 2001), the exchange rate correlated well with the number of people 
(both Americans and Canadians) entering the U.S. at the I-5 corridor.  An econometric analysis 
was performed in an attempt to explain the disruption of that relationship in the aftermath of 9/11.  
Several explanatory variables were analyzed, including the relative price of various goods and 
services (gasoline, cigarettes, clothing, consumer electronics, health care), the relative wage lev-
els in Canada, and the growing penetration of the Canadian market by “big box” retail chains.  No 
combination of variables was able to explain post-9/11 travel volumes.  A structural break in the 
relationship between economic conditions and travel volumes occurred in 2001 and has since 
persisted.  People’s discomfort with new inspection processes at the border is the likely cause of 
low travel volumes. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS: 
• The border processes established in the aftermath of 9/11 have disrupted the social/economic fabric of 
borderlands.   
• Borderlands have borne the brunt of the impact of heightened border security.  Impacts include a persis-
tent reduction in economic activity, and an undue budgetary burden as local jurisdictions handle the in-








































































































Southbound Crossings (Seasonally Adj.) Avg. Exchange Rate
Exchange Rate vs. Southbound Travelers at the Cascade Gateway 




































































The post-9/11 traffic pattern at the four largest 
POEs (Detroit, Buffalo, Blaine, Port Huron) has 
been different from the pattern exhibited at the 
border as a whole. 
9/11 
In the period following 9/11, the “Big 4” ports exhibited different behavior than the aggregate of 
the remaining ports.  Traffic declined sharply at the “Big 4,” whereas the overall pattern else-
where is more in keeping with macro-economic factors.  At the “Big 4” there are large population 
centers adjacent to the border, and discretionary travel (i.e., shopping, recreation, social visits) 
has historically been dominant.  It seems likely that discretionary travel was disproportionately 
impacted by either the harsher nature of the post-9/11 inspection processes, or by the conges-
tion resulting from the new processes.  Meanwhile, at small ports it is more likely that the border-
crossing experience differs little from that of the past.  
POLICY IMPLICATIONS: 
• Inspection processes (and/or the associated congestion) continue to impact the amount of cross-border 
traffic at the largest POEs—Buffalo, Detroit, Blaine, and Port Huron.  The programs thus far developed 
to address the problem (e.g., NEXUS) are only partially successful. 
• New initiatives designed to restore borderland vitality should be contemplated.  Initiatives should be     
targeted at congestion relief and/or inspection-process modifications. 
Monthly Volume of  Autos Entering the U.S. at Various POEs 
Buffalo, Detroit, Blaine, & Pt. Huron 73 POEs Other Than “Big 4” 
11 
SUMMARY OF POLICY CONCLUSIONS: 
• The economies of Canada and the U.S. are highly integrated.  Any inefficiencies associated with 
cross-border commerce hamper our integrated economy and reduce our global competitiveness. 
• The ideal freight-inspection regime delivers heightened security, while imposing little or no added 
burden (in terms of delay or cost).  Post-9/11 security regimes are not yet close to the ideal, with 
negative economic impacts persisting for the integrated Canada – U.S. economy. 
• A renewed effort to reduce border-related inefficiencies is important during the economic crisis.  
• The kinds of goods crossing the border are significantly different from port to port.  A security   
regime optimized for facilitation of one group of commodities (e.g., manufactured goods) will thus 
be more effective at some ports than others. 
• A FAST port has valuable infrastructure (a road lane and inspection booth) dedicated to the pro-
gram, so proof should exist that FAST enhances a port’s efficiency.  Alternative infrastructure use 
should be evaluated in instances where efficiency gains are not evident. 
• Alternative program designs should be evaluated, aiming to lower the costs of entry to FAST. 
• Significant net economic benefit can be realized by reworking NAFTA tariff schedules. 
• The travel-related inspection processes established in the aftermath of 9/11 have disrupted the   
social/economic fabric of borderlands. 
• Inspection processes (and/or the associated congestion) continue to impact the amount of cross-
border passenger travel at the largest POEs—Buffalo, Detroit, Blaine, and Port Huron.  The     
programs thus far developed to address the problem (e.g., NEXUS) are only partially successful. 
• New initiatives designed to restore borderland vitality should be contemplated.  Initiatives should 
be targeted at congestion relief and/or inspection-process modifications. 
• Significant reductions in border congestion can be achieved if more of the frequent border-crossers 
can be persuaded to enroll in NEXUS. 
• Marketing of NEXUS should be targeted at population centers close to the border and at  leisure 
travelers, rather than business travelers. 
• Deployment of a full suite of inspection technology at all 121 auto crossings requires a budget sev-
eral times larger than past budgets.  Absent such an investment, certain technologies can be de-
feated simply by crossing at a small port-of-entry. 
12 
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